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Abstract 
Young children engage cognitive control reactively in response to events, 
rather than proactively preparing for events. Such limitations in executive control 
have been explained in terms of fundamental constraints on children’s cognitive 
capacities. Alternatively, young children might be capable of proactive control but 
differ from older children in their meta-cognitive decisions regarding when to engage 
proactive control. We examined these possibilities in three conditions of a task-
switching paradigm, varying in whether task cues were available before or after target 
onset. Reaction times, ERPs, and pupil dilation showed that 5-year-olds did engage in 
advance preparation, a critical aspect of proactive control, but only when reactive 
control was made more difficult, whereas 10-year-olds engaged proactive control 
whenever possible. These findings highlight meta-cognitive processes in children’s 
cognitive control, an understudied aspect of executive control development.  
Keywords: executive control, meta-cognition, proactive control, reactive 
control, cognitive development, children. 
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Meta-cognitive processes in executive control development: 
The case of reactive and proactive control 
Many everyday activities require efficient control over one’s own thoughts 
and actions to ensure goal attainment (e.g., to keep working rather than check the 
news or daydream). Such executive control can be temporally engaged in different 
ways. For instance, when walking to a new place, one may engage control 
proactively, searching for directions beforehand, or reactively, figuring out directions 
while actually walking. Proactive and reactive modes of control, as first highlighted 
by the Dual Mechanisms of Control framework (Braver, 2012; Braver et al., 2007), 
present complementary advantages and limitations. Proactive control allows 
individuals to anticipate and prepare for upcoming events, hence engaging mental 
effort early to bias the cognitive system to prevent or minimize the effects of 
interference before it occurs. Proactive control is generally very efficient, but highly 
demanding on working memory, due to active maintenance of goal-relevant 
information through sustained activity in lateral prefrontal cortex (PFC) over 
relatively long periods. In contrast, reactive control is mobilized later in response to 
unforeseen events to resolve interference after it occurs. As such, it is less demanding 
because of transient activation of goal-relevant information and transient recruitment 
of lateral PFC (Braver, 2012; Marklund & Persson, 2012).  
Although adults vary in the recruitment of proactive and reactive control as a 
function of trait factors (e.g., working memory capacity), overall they flexibly engage 
the most adaptive control mode depending on contextual demands (e.g., whether or 
not upcoming events can be reliably predicted), as evidenced by changes in lateral 
PFC activity and pupil dilation in response to experimental manipulations that 
encourage reactive or proactive control (Braver, Paxton, Locke, & Barch, 2009; 
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Chiew & Braver, 2013). Such flexibility in control mode engagement is observed 
from age 8 on, but not in younger children, who appear to rely on reactive control 
even in situations where proactive control would seem to be more efficient (Blackwell 
& Munakata, 2013; Chatham, Frank, & Munakata, 2009; Chevalier et al., 2014; 
Vallesi & Shallice, 2007). For instance, Chatham et al. (2009) used pupil dilation, a 
well-established index of cognitive effort (e.g., Beatty, 1982), to track early and late 
mental effort engagement associated with proactive and reactive control, respectively. 
They observed that, when asked to respond to specific cue-target associations, 3-year-
olds show greater late mental effort (as shown by greater pupil dilation) after target 
onset, showing no anticipation of the target, whereas 8-year-olds show greater early 
mental effort before target onset; suggesting a shift from reactive to proactive control 
during childhood. The shift to proactive control seems to occur around 6 years of age, 
although proactive control continues to develop through late adolescence (Andrews-
Hanna et al., 2011; Chatham, Provan, & Munakata, in revision; Chevalier & al., 2014; 
Lucenet & Blaye, 2014). Understanding the reasons why young children do not 
engage the most mature and efficient forms of control is critical to uncover the 
mechanisms underpinning executive control development and to design effective 
interventions early in childhood.  
Young children may rely on reactive control because limited cognitive 
resources prevent the use of proactive control. For example, because of lower 
working memory capacity (e.g., Gathercole, Pickering, Ambridge, & Wearing, 2004), 
they may not be able to actively maintain task-relevant information active long 
enough to engage proactive control. From this perspective, quantitative increase in 
cognitive resources may support diversification of children’s control modes with age. 
Alternatively, changes in the meta-cognitive coordination of control modes may drive 
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executive control development. Specifically, young children may be able to exert 
control proactively, but may differ from older children and adults in the conditions 
under which they determine proactive control should be engaged. For example, 
proactive control is likely to be more effortful and less accurate for young children, 
due to lower cognitive resources or lack of practice. Therefore, young children may 
have a higher threshold for engaging it and may not realize the advantages of this 
more demanding control mode in some situations. 
The meta-cognitive coordination hypothesis builds on evidence that, across a 
variety of domains, multiple strategies can co-exist from early on, and the best 
strategy in a given situation (i.e., the strategy that allows the best performance with 
minimal cognitive effort) can be selected based on the automatic calculation of the 
respective costs and benefits of the available strategies (e.g., Adolph, 1997; Crowley 
& Siegler, 1993). Importantly, with age, information accumulates about the costs and 
benefits of each strategy in various situations, leading to more frequent selection and 
better execution of the most efficient strategies (e.g., Chen & Siegler, 2000; Lemaire 
& Brun, 2014; Siegler, 2007). According to the Expected Value of Control (EVC) 
theory (Shenhav, Botvinick, & Cohen, 2013), such evaluation of the costs and 
benefits of control and adequacy with task demands is critical to adulthood executive 
control. Dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) may integrate information on task 
demands and how well currently engaged control serves these demands in order to 
determine how control should be exerted (e.g. reactively or proactively). Increasing 
meta-cognitive coordination of control may drive control development in children 
(see Zelazo, 2004), and account for its relation with dACC activity in children (Fjell 
et al., 2012; Kelly et al., 2009; Kharitonova, Martin, Gabrieli, & Sheridan, 2013). 
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If young children rely on reactive control because of how they coordinate 
control, then making reactive control more difficult should weaken its dominance, and 
encourage them to select an alternative approach from their repertoire (e.g., Siegler, 
2007), increasing the likelihood of proactive control. In contrast, young children 
should not engage proactive control if they have insufficient cognitive resources for 
proactive control to be part of their repertoire, even when reactive control is more 
difficult. The cued task-switching paradigm (Meiran, 1996) is well suited to test these 
hypotheses because it allows manipulating the possibility to engage reactive and/or 
proactive control (e.g., Czernochowski, 2014). It requires switching back and forth 
between multiple tasks (e.g., color- and shape-matching tasks) as a function of a task 
cue signaling the upcoming task (e.g., a palette of colors for color-matching, a palette 
of geometric shapes for shape-matching). Proactive control in this paradigm is multi-
faceted, including processes related to task set maintenance and monitoring of 
upcoming task difficulty (e.g., Paxton et al., 2008; Czernochowski, 2014; Waxer & 
Morton, 2011), but perhaps its most prominent aspect is advance preparation based on 
task cues. In adults, early cue presentation yields better performance (e.g., Altmann, 
2004; Monsell, 2003) because it allows them to proactively determine the relevant 
task goal and task rules, hence preparing to process the upcoming target effectively 
(DeBaene & Brass, in press).  
Such advance preparation is also evidenced through event-related potentials 
(ERPs), whose excellent temporal resolution of brain activity is especially valuable 
for capturing the temporal dynamic of control. Specifically, early cue presentation is 
associated with a cue-locked late posterior positivity over parietal channels that 
reflects task selection (e.g., Jamadar, Michie, & Karayanidis, 2010; Karayanidis, 
Coltheart, Michie, & Murphy, 2003; Karayanidis, Jamadar, Ruge, Phillips, & 
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Heathcote, 2010; Jamadar, Hughes et al., 2010; Karayanidis, Mansfield et al., 2009). 
During childhood, similar behavioral and ERP effects are observed from 7 years of 
age onward (e.g., Cepeda, Kramer, & Gonzalez de Sather, 2001; Manzi, Nessler, 
Czernochowski, & Friedman, 2011), suggesting that school-age children also adopt a 
proactive approach, when they are offered the possibility to prepare in advance. In 
contrast, young children may not benefit as much from early cue presentation due to 
their bias toward reactive control (Chatham et al., 2009) and suboptimal processing of 
task cues (Chevalier & Blaye, 2009; Chevalier, Huber, Wiebe, & Espy, 2013).  
 To address whether proactive, advance preparation can be encouraged during 
childhood, the present study targeted two age groups: 5-year-old children, who start 
switching ably between tasks but still engage reactive control preferentially 
(Blackwell & Munakata, 2013; Chatham, Provan, & Munakata, in revision; Chevalier 
et al., 2014; Vallesi & Shallice, 2007), and 10-year-olds, who likely engage proactive 
control whenever this control mode is possible (Chatham et al., 2009). The cue-target 
interval was manipulated in three conditions of an age-appropriate, cued task-
switching paradigm (Figure 1). Specifically, in the “Proactive Impossible” condition, 
the task cue (e.g., patches of color) was presented simultaneously with the target (e.g., 
blue bear), hence preventing proactive preparation and encouraging reactive control. 
In the “Proactive Possible” condition, early cue presentation was continued after 
target onset, giving children the opportunity to prepare proactively for the upcoming 
target, but children could still reactively process the task cue after target onset. 
Finally, early cue presentation was terminated on target onset in the “Proactive 
Encouraged” condition, encouraging children to process the cue proactively by 
increasing the difficulty of reactive control, since the cue would had to be retrieved 
from memory if not processed before target onset. Besides behavioral indices, the 
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temporal dynamic of control was directly examined using cue-locked ERPs, through 
the late posterior positivity associated with cue-based task selection, and pupil 
dilation, whose temporal fluctuations reflect changes in mental effort—both indices 
have been previously used to capture reactive and proactive control (Chatham et al., 
2009; Chiew & Braver, 2013; Karayanidis et al., 2011).  
We expected 10-year-olds to engage proactive control whenever it was 
possible, that is, in the “Proactive Possible” and “Proactive Encouraged” conditions. 
Specifically, these children should show faster reaction times, more pronounced cue-
locked posterior positivity and greater cue-related pupil dilation in both conditions, 
relative to the “Proactive Impossible” condition. In contrast, we expected that the 
“Proactive Possible” condition would not provide a strong enough incentive for 5-
year-olds to prepare proactively, hence yielding no difference from the “Proactive 
Impossible” condition. Of prime interest was performance in the “Proactive 
Encouraged” condition. If 5-year-olds’ limited working-memory capacity prevents the 
utilization of proactive control, they should not show ERP or pupil dilation markers of 
proactive control in this condition either. Because this condition makes reactive 
control particularly challenging, RTs should increase and accuracy decrease. In 
contrast, if 5-year-olds are capable of proactive control, they should engage it in this 
condition because reactive control is much more challenging. They should show 
faster reaction times, more pronounced cue-locked posterior positivity and pupil 
dilation than in the other two conditions. ERPs and pupil dilation may provide the 
clearest indication of proactive control engagement, because behavior does not always 
initially change when children transition to new approaches (Siegler & Jenkins, 
1989).	  
Method 
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Participants 
 Study participants included 36 five-year-old children (mean age = 68.5 
months; SD = 2.7 months; 20 girls and 14 boys) and 28 ten-year-old children (mean 
age = 118.6 months; SD = 1.7 months; 17 girls and 13 boys). Four additional 5-year-
olds were excluded because of fussing. Initial recruitment included more 5-year-olds 
than 10-years-olds to compensate for greater exclusion rate due to poorer noise/signal 
ratio in younger children’s data. Most children were Caucasian (48 White, one Black, 
two Asian; race was not reported for the remaining 13 participants) and from middle 
to high socio-economic background (55 had at least one parent with a four-year 
college degree or higher, and three had at least one parent with some college 
education; parental education was not reported for the remaining six participants), 
which is reflective of the local community. All children were right-handed. Prior to 
participation, parental informed consent was obtained for all children. Ten-year-olds 
also gave informed assent.  
Materials and Procedure 
 A trained experimenter tested all participants individually in a single 90-
minute session at the laboratory. Each session started with sensor net application, 
followed by eye-tracking calibration. Children sat 60 cm away from the computer 
monitor and completed three successive conditions of an age-appropriate, cued task-
switching paradigm, and a selective sustained attention task (not presented here). 
After task completion, children received a developmentally appropriate toy and their 
accompanying parents received monetary compensation. 
 Each participant completed three conditions of the “Santa Claus Game”, run 
with E-Prime 1.2 (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA). In these adaptations 
of the cued task-switching paradigm, children helped Santa to prepare for next 
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Christmas by sorting toys (i.e., the targets) by either their shape or their color. Three 
combinations of shapes and colors were used (one for each condition), bear-car-blue-
red, airplane-doll-green-orange, and train-horse-purple-pink. On each trial, one 8 × 8-
cm bidimensional target (e.g., a blue bear) was presented within a black circle at the 
center of the screen and four 2 × 2-cm unidimensional response pictures (e.g., a bear, 
a red patch, a car and a blue patch) were constantly presented below the black circle. 
Each response picture corresponded to one of the four horizontally aligned buttons on 
a response pad. Children were asked to keep their four fingers (index and middle 
fingers of each hand) on the response pad and respond by pressing the response 
button that matched either the color or the shape of the target as a function of the task 
cues. Task cues were displayed on the black circle (12 gray geometrical shapes 
signaled that shape was relevant, whereas 12 patches of different colors signaled that 
color was relevant).  
On each trial, children saw a fixation cross within the black circle for 1000 to 
1200 ms (jittered inter-trial interval) followed by a Christmas gift (i.e., brown 
wrapped box), which contained the toy that they had to sort next. After 1500 ms, the 
target replaced the box and remained on screen until a response was entered or for up 
to 10 sec. Critically, the timing of cue presentation was manipulated across conditions 
(Figure 1). In the “Proactive Impossible” condition, the task cue was presented at the 
same time as the target, so that proactive cue processing was impossible (non-
informative brown circles were presented instead of the cue while the gift was 
displayed), hence forcing participants to select the relevant task after target onset. In 
contrast, the cue was presented along with the gift and remained visible after target 
onset in the “Proactive Possible” condition, so that cue-based proactive preparation 
was possible but not necessary. Finally, early cue presentation (i.e., along with the 
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gift) was terminated before target onset in the “Proactive Encouraged” condition, 
hence making reactive control more challenging and providing a strong incentive to 
process the cue proactively (select the relevant task, ahead of target presentation). Cue 
conditions were blocked and their order was counterbalanced across participants. 
Participants were explicitly informed of the change in cue presentation as they started 
a new condition. For the sake of pupillometric data, objects presented before and after 
target onset were roughly equivalent in complexity (similar cartoon design with 
similar levels of detail) and luminance (similar color brightness calculated based on 
the RGB color model). In addition, the spatial location of the patches of 
colors/geometric shapes/non-informative brown circles was slightly rotated within the 
black circle on target onset so that a perceptual change occurred at the level of the cue 
in all three conditions. 
 Each condition started with two demonstration trials in which the 
experimenter demonstrated how to sort toys according to one of the dimensions (e.g., 
color), followed by four practice trials completed by the child. Demonstration and 
practice trials were repeated for the other dimension. Children were then instructed 
that they would play the Color and Shape games at the same time and completed 15 
practice trials after six demonstration trials. Guidance and feedback were provided 
during these trials that could be repeated if necessary. Although response pictures 
were displayed on the buttons and on the screen to help children match each button 
with its corresponding response picture, they were subsequently removed from the 
button box (but remained visible on the screen) during the test phase to reduce head 
movements (and related artifacts in the EEG data). In the test phase, children 
completed three series of 21 trials separated by short breaks (generally below two 
minutes). Test trials contained 30 no-switch trials, where the relevant task repeated, 
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and 30 switch trials where the relevant task changed (plus three start trials)1. Switch 
and no-switch trials alternated unpredictably.  
Data Recording and Processing 
 Behavioral data. Accuracy was calculated as the percent of correct responses 
on switch and no-switch trials. Reaction times (RTs) were examined for correct 
responses after discarding outliers, that is, values greater than M + 3 SD, and values 
lower than 200 ms or M – 3 SD (1.6%). Only one 5-year-old did not have at least five 
values per experimental cell and was excluded from RT analysis. For the remaining 
children, on average 21 and 26 trials per experimental cell (out of 30) were included 
in RT analysis at ages 5 and 10, respectively. Reaction times were log-transformed 
prior to statistical analyses to control for age-related baseline differences (Meiran, 
1996). For the sake of clarity, we reported both log-transformed and raw values.  
 ERP data. EEG data were recorded at a 250 Hz sampling rate using 128-
channel Hydrocel Electrical Geodesic Sensor Net and Net Station 4.3.1 (Electrical 
Geodesics Inc, EGI, Eugene, OR). Impedances were kept below 50 kΩ. Recording in 
every channel was vertex-referenced. The EEG data were processed offline using Net 
Station 4.3.1 and EP Toolkit 2.23 (Dien, 2010) for filtering, segmentation, artifact 
detection, eye blink correction, bad channel replacement, and averaging. The 
continuous data were first digitally filtered using a 30-Hz low-pass filter. Next, 
correct switch trials and no-switch trials were segmented into a 1200 ms time window 
around cue/gift onset, including a 200 ms baseline period. Artifact removal was 
performed twice, first within Net Station and then using EP Toolkit 2.23. In Net 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Due to time constraints, we elected not to include single-task blocks, because we did 
not expect the timing of cue presentation to affect performance in such blocks where 
there is no task uncertainty and thus no need for cue-based proactive preparation. 
Indeed, children and adults rarely fixate the cue in single-task blocks (Chevalier, 
Blaye, Dufau, & Lucenet, 2010).  
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Station, a channel was considered bad if its amplitude for a specific trial varied by 
over 160µV during the entire segment. Eye blinks were rejected if the amplitude 
varied by over 200µV. Channels were rejected if they were marked bad on more than 
20% of the segments. A segment was rejected if it contained more than 16 bad 
channels. Then, using EP Toolkit 2.23, an automated independent components 
analysis (ICA) corrected any eye blinks that were not identified by Net Station. A 
channel was considered bad for a specific trial if its amplitude varied by over 100µV 
within that trial or rejected for the entire task if they were marked as bad on at least 
20% of the trials. Bad channels were corrected using spline interpolation based on 
neighboring channels (M = 3.3, SD = 1.0 at age 5; M = 2.5; SD = 1.0 at age 10). Trials 
were rejected if 10% or more of the channels had poor signal. Following artifact 
correction, data were re-referenced to the average reference and baseline corrected 
using the 200 ms pre-cue period. Correct switch and no-switch trials in each condition 
were analyzed. Children with at least 10 good segments in all of the experimental 
cells were included in subsequent analyses, which falls within the range 
recommended and used with young children (DeBoer, Scott, & Nelson, 2005; Rueda, 
Posner, Rothbart, & Davis-Stober, 2004). On average, there were 18 good segments 
per experimental cell (out of 30) at age 5 (N = 28) and 26 at age 10 (N = 28). 
 Pupillometric data. Pupil dilation was recorded at a 50-Hz sampling rate using 
a Tobii x50 eye-tracker and ClearView software (Tobii, Stockholm, Sweden). 
Calibration was achieved after net application and before completing the task-
switching paradigm, using a 5-point procedure. Analysis of pupil dilation was limited 
to the first 2500 ms of each trial, that is, the 1500 ms gift/cue presentation and the first 
1000 ms following target onset. The 200 ms immediately preceding cue/gift onset 
(during which a fixation cross was presented) were used as baseline for each trial and 
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pupil dilation was calculated as percent change from this baseline, in order to control 
for age-related differences in baseline pupil diameter (Chatham et al., 2009). 
Measurements for correct trials were averaged into consecutive 60-ms bins. Trials 
that contained valid data points for less than half of the segment were discarded. 
Children with at least 5 good trials in each experimental cell were included in the 
statistical analyses (N = 26 at age 5 and N = 24 at age 10). On average, there were 19 
good segments per experimental cell (out of 30) at age 5 and 26 at age 10. 
 Unless otherwise noted, all measures were analyzed using 3 (Condition: 
Proactive Impossible, Proactive Possible, Proactive Encouraged) × 2 (Trial Type: No-
switch, Switch) × 2 (Age: 5, 10) mixed design ANOVAs2. 
Results 
As expected, 10-year-olds showed proactive preparation whenever it was 
possible (in both the “Proactive Possible” and “Proactive Encouraged” conditions), 
across reaction times, ERPs, and pupil dilation. Five-year-olds showed the capacity 
for proactive preparation across these measures, but only when reactive control was 
made more difficult (in the “Proactive Encouraged” condition). 
Behavioral Analyses 
Reaction times. RTs are shown in Figure 2A. Age, condition, and trial type 
significantly affected RTs, F(1, 61) = 149.912, p < .001, η2p = .711, F(2, 122) = 
50.968, p < .001, η2p = .455, and F(1, 61) = 70.376, p < .001, η2p = .536, respectively. 
These effects were qualified by significant two-way interactions between age and 
condition, F(2, 122) = 5.592, p = .005, η2p = .084, and age and trial type, F(1, 61) = 
7.838, p = .007, η2p = .114, and a three-way interaction between age, condition and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 To maximize generalizability of the findings, each analysis included all the 
participants with enough data, resulting in slightly different Ns across measures. 
Analyses run on the subsample of children who contributed data for all measures (N = 
22 at age 5, N = 24 at age 10) yielded the same results. 
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trial type, F(2, 122) = 5.261, p = .006, η2p = .079. As expected, 5-year-olds (7.79 ln 
ms; 2791 ms) responded slower than 10-year-olds (7.04 ln ms; 1317 ms), and children 
were faster on no-switch trials (7.38 ln ms; 1989 ms) than switch trials (7.46 ln ms; 
2120 ms), hence showing significant switch costs. Most importantly, 5-year-olds 
performed faster in the “Proactive Encouraged” condition (7.63 ln ms; 2324 ms) than 
the other two conditions, ps < .001, whereas RTs in the “Proactive Possible” 
condition (7.83 ln ms; 2937 ms) were only marginally faster than in the “Proactive 
Impossible” condition (7.94 ln ms; 3200 ms), p = .066. In contrast, 10-year-olds 
responded faster in both the “Proactive Possible” and “Proactive Encouraged” 
conditions (6.86 ln ms; 1224 ms, and 6.94 ln ms; 1105 ms, respectively) than the 
“Impossible” condition (7.32 ln ms; 1624 ms), ps < .001, whereas RTs in the first two 
conditions did not significantly differ, p = .115. In addition, 10-year-olds showed 
significantly smaller switch costs in the “Proactive Impossible” condition (0.05 ln ms, 
76 ms) than the “Proactive Possible” (0.13 ln ms; 130 ms) and “Proactive 
Encouraged” conditions (0.17 ln ms; 160 ms), ps < .040, whereas switch costs did not 
differ across conditions at age 5, all ps > .154.  
Accuracy. The ANOVA on accuracy revealed significant main effects of age, 
F(1, 62) = 38.424, p < .001, η2p = .383, trial type, F(1, 62) = 26.356, p < .001, η2p = 
.298, and condition, F(2, 124) = 4.671, p = .011, η2p = .070. As expected, 5-year-olds 
achieved lower accuracy rates (71.1%) than 10-year-olds (91.1%), and children 
showed lower accuracy on switch trials (79.6%) than no-switch trials (82.6%). 
Accuracy was significantly lower in the “Proactive Encouraged” condition (78.0%) 
relative to the “Proactive Possible” condition (83.4%), p < .001, and marginally so 
relative to the “Proactive Impossible” condition (81.8%), p = .051; the latter two 
conditions did not differ significantly, p = .445 (Figure 2B). Although the Condition × 
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Age interaction did not reach significance, F(2, 124) = 2.359, p = .099, η2p = .037, 
follow-up analyses showed the effect of condition was significant at age 5, F(2, 70) = 
5.089, p = .009, η2p = .127, but not at age 10, p = .934. The other interactions were not 
significant, ps > .842.  
Five-year-olds’ faster RTs, accompanied by lower accuracy, in the “Proactive 
Encouraged” condition did not seem to reflect a speed/accuracy tradeoff (e.g., more 
impulsive responding) rather than the use of proactive control, given that the effect of 
condition on RTs held even when controlling for accuracy in a mixed model, F(2, 
169) = 45.87, p < .001, η2 = .66. RTs were slower in both the “Proactive Impossible” 
and “Proactive Possible” conditions than in the “Proactive Encouraged” condition, 
estimated coefficient: .247, t(169) = 5.14, p < .001, and estimated coefficient: .105, 
t(169) = 2.16, p = .031, respectively.  
ERP Analyses  
The cue/gift-locked waveforms showed on all trial types an initial posterior 
peak around 400 ms that extended into a positive-going slow-wave over posterior 
channels between 500 and 900 ms post cue onset, corresponding to the posterior 
positivity related to proactive preparation (Figure 3A and 3B). The timing and 
topography is consistent with a previous report with children (Manzi et al., 2011). The 
peak channels were circumscribed with a spatial principal component analysis (PCA), 
using the covariance matrix and infomax rotation. Based on the scree plot (Cattell, 
1966), 13 spatial factors were retained that accounted for approximately 83% of the 
spatial variance in the ERPs data. The topography of the first spatial factor, which 
accounted for 11% of the variance, matched the late posterior positivity. Waveforms 
were averaged across the channels whose factor loadings on the first spatial factor 
were greater than .6 (Dien, 2010): 84, 85 and 91 (Figure 3A).  
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The initial peak was indexed by the mean amplitude between 300 and 500 ms 
after cue/gift onset within each condition separately (Figure 3C, left). Visual 
inspection of the data showed that this window included the peaks from all 
participants while not overlapping with other components. There were a significant 
effect of condition, F(2, 108) = 8.342, p < .001, η2p = .134, and a significant 
Condition × Age interaction, F(2, 108) = 3.123, p = .048, η2p = .0553. On both trial 
types, amplitude tended to be more pronounced in the “Proactive Encouraged” 
condition than in the “Proactive Possible” and “Proactive Impossible” conditions at 
age 5, although pairwise comparisons fell short of significance, p = .093 and p = .076, 
respectively. The latter conditions did not differ from each other, p = .885. In contrast, 
10-year-olds showed a greater amplitude in both the “Proactive Encouraged” and 
“Proactive Possible” conditions, relative to the “Proactive Impossible” condition, ps < 
.003; with no difference between the former two conditions, p = .362. Finally, there 
was a significant interaction between trial type and age, F(2, 108) = 6.929, p = .011, 
η2p = .114, due to greater amplitude on switch trials than no-switch trials at age 10, p 
= .015, whereas switch and no-switch trials did not differ at age 5, p = .188. 
As the peak extended into a positive slow-wave, it was also explored by 
averaging magnitude across 100-ms intervals, between 500 and 900 ms, following 
Manzi et al. (2011). This was done separately for each age group because of age-
related differences in the time course of the posterior positivity. Preliminary analyses 
showed that condition had a significant effect on mean amplitude between 500 and 
800 ms at age 5, and between 500 and 900 ms at age 10. Therefore, the two age 
groups were compared on the interval during which condition had a significant effect 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 To control for age-related baseline differences in ERP magnitude, the data were also 
analyzed after normalization, which was conducted by computing z scores of mean 
amplitudes separately for each age group. These analyses showed the same significant 
effects. 
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for both age groups, that is, 500 to 800ms after cue/gift onset (Figure 3C, right). The 
effect of condition, F(2, 108) = 20.086, p < .001, η2p = .271, interacted with age, F(2, 
108) = 4.259, p = .017, η2p = .073. On both trial types, the amplitude was greater at 
age 5 in the “Proactive Encouraged” condition than the other two conditions, ps < 
.012, which did not differ from each other, p = .478. In contrast, 10-year-olds showed 
greater amplitudes in both the “Proactive Encouraged” and the “Proactive Possible” 
conditions relative to the “Proactive Impossible” condition, ps < .001, with no 
significant difference between the former two, p = .402.  
Pupillometric Analyses 
 Pupil size increases progressively and peaks about one second after the 
relevant event onset in adults (e.g., Wierda, Rijn, Taatgen, & Martens, 2012). 
Consistently, we observed a peak in pupil dilation between 1000 and 1500 ms after 
cue/gift onset for both age groups (Figure 4A). Interestingly, these peaks extended 
during the following 500 ms in some of the conditions. Therefore, we examined mean 
pupil dilation during these two windows.  
 Between 1000 and 1500 ms after cue/gift onset, pupil dilation tended to 
change more on switch (1.36%) than no-switch trials (1.13%), F(1, 48) = 3.724, p = 
.060, η2p = .072 (Figure 4B). During the following 500 ms, change in pupil dilation 
was affected by condition4, F(2, 96) = 4.888, p = .010, η2p = .092. There was also a 
significant Condition × Age interaction, F(2, 96) = 3.34, p = .040, η2p = .065. Five-
year-olds showed greater change in pupil dilation in the “Proactive Encouraged” 
condition (1.22%) than in the “Proactive Impossible” condition (0.49%), p = .038, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Although the difference in pupil dilation change across conditions reached 
significance right after target onset, it is unlikely to reflect target processing because 
pupil dilation takes a second or more to peak after event onset. Instead, it is more 
likely to reflect prolonged processing of the cue related to task preparation. Further, 
Figure 4 shows that pupillary response starts differentiating across conditions before 
target onset, although these differences did not reach significance yet. 
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and in the “Possible” condition (0.48%), p = .037, whereas the latter two conditions 
did not differ, p = .999. In contrast, 10-year-olds showed greater change in pupil 
dilation in both the “Proactive Encouraged” and “Proactive Possible” conditions 
(1.76% and 2.17%, respectively), relative to the “Proactive Impossible” condition 
(0.89%), ps < .019; the former two did not differ from each other, p = .370. Finally, 
although pupil dilation tended to show greater change on switch trials (1.29%) than 
no-switch trials (1.05%), the effect of trial type failed to reach significance, F(1, 48) = 
2.936, p = .093. 
Discussion 
 The present study addressed the nature of young children’s bias towards 
reactive control by examining whether 5- and 10-year-old children engage proactive 
control when the advantage of proactive control over reactive control is manipulated 
in a task-switching paradigm. Ten-year-olds engaged in proactive, advance 
preparation whenever this control mode was possible, as shown by faster RTs, more 
pronounced cue-locked posterior positivity, and greater cue-related pupil dilation in 
the “Proactive Possible” (and “Proactive Encouraged”) condition than the “Proactive 
Impossible” condition. In contrast, 5-year-olds displayed a bias towards reactive 
control even when proactive control was possible, hence extending to a paradigm 
involving set shifting previous evidence for a shift from reactive to proactive control 
observed during childhood in measures of inhibition and working memory (Chatham 
et al., 2009; Chevalier et al., 2014; Lucenet & Blaye, 2014; see also Vallesi & 
Shallice, 2007). Critically, despite being biased towards reactive control, 5-years-olds 
showed a proactive profile when the advantage of proactive control over reactive 
control was increased. As discussed below, these findings suggest that 5-year-olds 
reliance on reactive control does not result from fundamental limitations on working-
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memory capacity preventing proactive control, but from age-related differences in 
meta-cognitive coordination of control modes.  
At 5 years of age, children responded faster and showed a more pronounced 
posterior positivity and greater cue-related pupil dilation when proactive control was 
encouraged and reactive control was more difficult. These findings contrast with the 
pattern expected if children had engaged reactive control in the “Proactive 
Encouraged” condition, which included slower reaction times. Although faster 
responding was accompanied by lower accuracy in this condition, greater impulsivity 
is unlikely to account for our results because RTs were significantly faster in the 
“Proactive Encouraged” condition even after controlling for accuracy. Moreover, 5-
year-olds’ engagement of proactive control is clearly shown by the ERP and 
pupillometric markers of advance preparation observed in the “Proactive Encouraged” 
condition. These findings rule out the hypothesis that too little working memory 
capacity puts proactive control totally out of these children’s reach. Indeed, 5-year-
olds showed a proactive pattern in the “Proactive Encouraged” condition although the 
discontinuation of cue presentation after target onset increased working memory 
demands by requiring greater active maintenance of the task goal.  
Since proactive control is already part of young children’s repertoire of control 
modes, 5-year-olds likely differ from 10-year-olds in the conditions under which they 
engage each control mode. Lower accuracy when using proactive control suggests 
that young children may have a threshold for engaging proactive control that is higher 
than in adults. Given the relatively underdeveloped nature of their proactive control, 
young children may engage proactive control only when reactive control is much 
more difficult to implement. Greater effort or lower accuracy associated with 
proactive control may bias young children against this control mode, such that their 
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higher threshold for engaging proactive control may be adaptive. With age and greater 
practice, proactive control becomes less demanding, leading children to progressively 
associate proactive control with a more advantageous cost/benefit ratio resulting in its 
more frequent engagement. Consistently, children continue to engage proactive 
control more systematically through late adolescence (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2011; 
Killikelly & Szűcs, 2013; Waxer & Morton, 2011). 
Although lower accuracy when 5-year-olds engaged proactive control 
suggests that the bias towards reactive control may be adaptive at that age, lower 
accuracy may have also resulted from additional working memory demands due to 
early discontinuation of cue presentation in the “Proactive Encouraged” condition. 
Had 5-year-olds engaged proactive control in the “Proactive Possible” condition, they 
may have shown faster RTs without lower accuracy. Asking children to label the 
relevant task before target onset (with cue information still visible afterwards) is one 
way to encourage proactive control without such additional working-memory 
demands. Labeling has repeatedly been shown to benefit older children (Karbach & 
Kray, 2007; Kray, Eber, & Karbach, 2008), and preliminary findings suggest that it 
may also speed up responding at age 5 without decreasing accuracy (Lucenet et al., 
2012).  
Therefore, when both reactive and proactive controls are possible, reactive 
control may not always be the most adaptive option for young children, which implies 
that coordination of control modes may refine and become more adaptive during 
childhood. Specifically, over childhood, children may build more explicit or complete 
representations of available control modes and potential alternatives, hence 
facilitating the evaluation of the adequacy between task demands and available 
control means (e.g., proactive control is more efficient than reactive control when the 
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upcoming task can be reliably predicted by early cue presentation). An open question 
is the extent to which this coordination is achieved intentionally or not. With age, 
children may increasingly reflect on their own functioning (Zelazo, 2004), which is 
consistent with increasing meta-cognitive processes in tasks tapping executive control 
at school age (e.g., Roderer & Roebers, 2014). Alternatively, the evaluation of control 
mode adequacy and control coordination may be largely unintentional and refined 
through practice and dACC maturation (see Shenhav et al., 2013). 
Since switching to a new task is more demanding than repeating the same 
task, one may have expected proactive preparation to benefit switch trials mostly, 
unlike the similar effect of condition on switch and no-switch trials observed here. 
Such an expectation relies on the incorrect assumption that implementing switches is 
the greatest executive challenge for children in the task-switching paradigm. Previous 
research has shown that both no-switch and switch trials within mixed-task blocks are 
highly demanding for children. Indeed, change in performance across the lifespan is 
driven by performance increase on both switch and no-switch trials within mixed-task 
blocks (relative to single-task blocks) to a much greater extent than difference 
between switch and no-switch trials within mixed-task blocks (e.g., Dibbets & Jolles, 
2006; Karbach & Kray, 2007; Reimers & Maylor, 2005). Hence, the most critical 
challenge for young children is to identify the relevant task under conditions of task 
uncertainty, even on trials where no task switch is expected, and this ability is one of 
the most critical elements driving age-related change in performance. Proactive 
control can be just as helpful for children to determine the relevant task on no-switch 
trials as on switch trials, since early identification of the relevant task should facilitate 
target processing, even on trials where the relevant task happens to repeat. This is 
probably even more so for younger children who tend to approach switch and no-
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switch trials in a more similar fashion than do adults (Chevalier et al., 2013), and for 
whom simpler tasks tap executive control to a larger degree than later in development 
(Cepeda, Blackwell, & Munakata, 2013). Relatedly, overall faster performance when 
advance preparation was possible was accompanied by greater switch costs at age 10. 
These children may have sustained the task rules more robustly in working memory 
when the task was prepared for in advance, making it harder to switch from that rule 
on the next trial, in a phenomenon akin to asymmetrical switch costs (e.g., Ellefson et 
al., 2006). Younger children may not have shown this pattern because of less robust 
working memory; so that variations based on whether the task was prepared for in 
advanced had less effect on subsequent trials. 
The present study focused on advance preparation, the most prominent aspect 
of proactive control in the task-switching paradigm. How other aspects of proactive 
control (e.g. task set maintenance, monitoring upcoming task difficulty) develop and 
are coordinated during childhood remain to be clarified in future studies. Of particular 
interest is the interplay between advance preparation and these other aspects in 
yielding increasingly proactive profiles with advancing age.  
In addition, reactive control was inferred here from the lack of advance 
preparation, given that children of this age are capable of reactive control (e.g., 
Chatham et al., 2009) and task-switching taps control processes even in young 
children. For example, performance on task-switching paradigms in early childhood 
correlates with other cognitive control tasks, such as Go/No-Go and working memory 
span tasks (e.g., Chevalier et al., 2012), and loads onto the same latent factor as other 
cognitive control tasks (e.g., Clark et al., 2014). These findings make it likely that 
children in our study who did not show proactive profiles of performance instead 
relied on reactive control, rather than on non-controlled processes. Nonetheless, 
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reactive control should be directly assessed in future studies, for instance by probing 
how task conflict affects performance and by examining reactive control-related 
ERPs, such as the pre-response negativity in adults (Czernochowski et al., 2010; 
Czernochowski, 2014).  
In conclusion, the present study showed that children as young as 5 years can 
successfully engage proactive control. Their bias toward reactive control does not 
result from fundamental limitations in working memory capacity, but from meta-
cognitive decisions regarding when to engage proactive control. Executive control 
development should not be conceived exclusively in terms of quantity of control or 
growing repertoire of control modes with advancing age, but also in terms of changes 
on the meta-cognitive coordination of these control modes. Such a proposal shifts our 
perspective on executive control development, and is consistent with the prominent 
role that is often attributed to meta-cognition in cognitive development more broadly 
(e.g., Kuhn, 2000; Chen & Siegler, 2000; Roderer & Roebers, 2014; Siegler, 2007; 
Schneider, 2008). These findings also have important implications for improving 
cognitive control early in development. Extant intervention programs try to improve 
children’s control abilities per se with long training regimens that have met limited 
success, especially in terms of transfer effects (Diamond, 2012; Wass, Scerif, & 
Johnson, 2012). Our results suggest that modifying the environment to guide children 
in the utilization of the most adaptive form of control is a promising alternative that 
could be easily implemented, inexpensive, and immediately effective. 
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Figure 1. Illustration of the cued task-switching paradigm used in each condition. 
Children had to switch between sorting the target by shape or by color. In this 
example, the multiple patches of color signal that color is the relevant sorting 
dimension. In the “Proactive Impossible” condition, target onset was preceded by 
neutral information (brown circles) regarding the upcoming task, hence making 
proactive preparation impossible. In the “Proactive Possible” condition the task cue 
was presented earlier but remained visible after target onset, making proactive 
preparation possible but not necessary. In the “Proactive Encouraged” condition, the 
early presentation of the task cue was discontinued after target onset, hence providing 
a strong incentive to proactively process the cue before target onset.  
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Figure 2. Mean reaction times (left) and accuracy rates (right) for 5- and 10-year-olds 
in each condition. Error bars indicate stander errors. Five-year-olds responded faster 
only when they were strongly encouraged to prepare proactively, whereas 10-year-
olds showed faster RTs whenever proactive preparation was possible. Accuracy was 
lower in the “Proactive Encouraged” condition than in the other two conditions at age 
5. 
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Figure 3. Cue/gift-locked posterior positivity. (A) The topography of the spatial factor 
corresponding to the late posterior positive slow-wave is shown on the left, with peak 
channels (factor loading > 0.6) marked in red. Waveforms, averaged across the peak 
channels, are shown in the middle and right panels, with grayed areas signaling the 
windows during which amplitude significantly differed across conditions. (B) 
Topographies of the late posterior positivity. (C). Mean amplitudes. Vertical bars 
indicate standard errors. At age 5, the posterior positivity was more pronounced in the 
“Proactive Encouraged” condition than the other conditions. At age 10, the posterior 
positivity was more pronounced after cue onset in both the “Proactive Encouraged” 
and “Proactive Possible” conditions, relative to the “Proactive Impossible” condition. 
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Figure 4. Change in pupil dilation over the course of a trial at ages 5 (A) and 10 (B) 
in each condition. Grayed areas show the windows used for statistical analysis. The 
first gray dotted line signals cue/gift onset (0ms) and the second line signals target 
onset (1500ms). Mean values are shown in the lower panel (C). Vertical bars indicate 
standard errors. The initial peak observed between 1000 and 1500ms after cue onset 
did not differ across conditions. However, the peak extended over the following 
500ms only in the “Proactive Encouraged” condition at age 5, and in both the 
“Proactive Possible” and “Proactive Encouraged” conditions at age 10. 
